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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Liability of the Common Carrier for Loss or
Damage to Goods in Ohio
If a man shall deliver unto his neighbor money or stuff to keep
... If a man deliver unto his neighbor an ass, or an ox, or a sheep, or
any beast to keep... And if a man borrow ought of his neighbor.... 1
These, the Bible tells us, are a few of the ancient problems significant
enough to be dealt with by the Mosaic law. People have, in fact, always
found it convenient, for any one of a number of reasons, to intrust their
goods to other men; and rules regarding rights, duties, and liabilities of
the parties to such a transaction have been developed under nearly all of
the systems of law that the world has known.2
While doubtless of humble origin, the carriage of goods from place
to place as a purpose for such transactions has taken on great commer-
cial importance through the centuries. As men began to hire out to the
public their services as carriers of freight, carrying the goods of many
people simultaneously, the development of legal rules regarding rights,
duties, and liabilities, as between individual shippers and carriers, began
to be tempered by considerations of the public good. To briefly examine
one of these rules, developed by the common law but greatly modified
and relaxed by the courts and legislature of Ohio, is the purpose of this
note.
I. THE COMMON LAW HERITAGE
The leading case in the law of bailments in general, and the liability
of carriers in particular, is Coggs v. Bernard,3 wherein Lord Holt an-
nounced that the common carrier "... . is bound to answer for the goods
at all events."4  Thus, the common carrier was an insurer of the goods
intrusted to him. The reasoning behind the imposition of the rule of
absolute liability, in the quaint language of Lord Holt, is as follows:
And this is a politic establishment, contrived by the policy of the law,
for the safety of all persons, the necessity of whose affairs obliges them to
trust these sorts of persons, that they may be safe in their ways of dealing;
for else these carriers might have an opportunity of undoing all persons
that had any dealings with them, by combining with theives, and so forth,
and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner as would not be possible to
be discovered.'
1. Exodus 22:7, 10, 14.
2. See, e.g., MOnEY, OUTLmNEs oF ROMAN LAW 355-58, 365-68 (ld ed. 1914).
3. 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (1703).
4. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 918 (1703).
5. Ibid.
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Mr. Justice Holmes denies that Lord Holes decision was a mere pro-
nouncement of settled principles of the common law; it being, rather, a
fragmentary survival of the long overthrown rule that originally imposed
absolute liability upon all bailees, applied by Lord Holt to common car-
riers because of his own notions of public policy.6 At any rate, the prin-
ciple became firmly engrafted upon the law by 1785, when Lord Mans-
field decided Forward v. Pittard7 announcing the following to be the
rule and its rationale:
... to prevent litigation, collusion, and the necessity of going into cir-
cumstances impossible to be unravelled, the law presumes against the car-
rier unless he shews it was done by the King's enemies, or by such act as
could not happen by the intervention of man, as storms, lightning and
tempests.
It must be noted that there is an important distinction between a
common and a private carrier. The common carrier may be treated as
an insurer of goods intrusted to him, but the private carrier suffers only
the responsibility of the ordinary bailee - the duty to use ordinary care
and liability only for losses caused by his own negligence.9
It is of extreme importance, therefore, that a determination be made
as to whether a particular carrier may be dassified as common or private.
The traditional statement of the distinction has been provided by Mr.
Justice Story in the following language:
It is not every person who undertakes to carry goods for hire that is
deemed a common carrier. A private person may contract with another
for the carriage of his goods, and incur no responsibility beyond that of
any ordinary bailee for hire, that is to say, the responsibility of ordinary
diligence. To bring a person within the description of a common carrier,
he must exercise it as a public employment;, he must undertake to carry
goods for persons generally; and he must hold himself out as ready to en-
gage in the transportation of goods for hire as a business, not as a casual
occupation pro hac vice.1'
II. THE COMMON CARRIER OF GOODS IN OHIO
When called upon to define which haulers are common carriers, the
courts of Ohio have adopted the substance of this definition," with par-
6. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 180 (1881).
7. 1 Term Rep. (Durnford & East) 27 (1785).
8. Forward v. Pittard, 1 Term Rep. (Durnford & East) 27, 33 (1785). The latter
part of the quotation indicates that certain exceptions to the insurer's liability existed
at the common law. These will subsequently be discussed in greater detail.
9. DOBIE, BAILMENTs & CARRIERS § 106 (1914).
10. STORY, BAILMENTS § 495 (7th ed. 1863).
11. Motor Freight, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 120 Ohio St. 1, 165 N.E.
355 (1929); Breuer v. Public Utilities Commission, 118 Ohio St. 95, 160 N.E. 623
(1928); Hissem v. Guran, 112 Ohio St. 59, 146 N.E. 808 (1925).
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ticular emphasis being placed upon a holding out as being ready to trans-
port for all persons indiscriminately.' 2 Thus, a man who makes his liv-
ing hauling dairy products for a milk producer's association is not a com-
mon carrier, having made no representation to the public at large that
he would carry goods for all persons choosing to employ him.' 3  Even the
actual solicitation of hauling contracts will not qualify a man as a com-
mon carrier unless he has made an offer to do business with the public
generally.14 Conversely, the mere fact that a hauler of goods requires his
customers to sign individual contracts and to meet certain credit stand-
ards will not protect him from treatment as a common carrier, as long
as he represents that he will haul for anyone who is willing and able to
meet those requirements. 5
The common carrier, by this representation that its services are avail-
able to the public generally and indiscriminately, in effect dedicates its
property to public use. It is small wonder, then, that considerations of
public policy should play a dominant role in judicial determinations re-
garding the incidents of the relationship between the common carrier
and its customers - the public. Such were the apparent sentiments of
the Ohio courts, which early adopted the rule of the English common
law, making the common carrier an insurer of all goods with which it is
intrusted.16
The general rule in reference to a bailee for hire-that he is only
answerable for the loss of the goods where he has been wanting in ordinary
care and diligence-is in most cases a reasonable and just one, and is
only departed from in the case of a common carrier, on account of the
peculiar relation he has assumed to the conmunity.17
Such were the early judicial pronouncements, and modern authorities
have reiterated the rule that a common carrier is an insurer of freight
against all losses.' 8 Pragmatically speaking, however, the modern com-
mon carrier does not normally suffer this absolute liability. Extensive
exceptions to the common law rule have developed, and the courts have
12. "The distinctive characteristic of a common carrier is that he undertakes to carry
for all people indifferently. The contributing factor in determining the status of
one as a common carrier is his public profession or holding out, by words or course
of conduct as to the service offered or performed." Columbus-Cincinnati Trucking
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 141 Ohio St. 228, 232, 47 N.E.2d 623, 625
(1943).
13. Hissem v. Guran, 112 Ohio St. 59, 146 N.E. 808 (1925).
14. Samms v. Stewart, 20 Ohio 69 (1851).
15. Bruer v. Public Utilities Commission, 118 Ohio St. 95, 160 N.E. 603 (1928).
16. Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 362 (1854); Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio St.
131 (1853).
17. Samms v. Stewart, 20 Ohio 70, 73 (1851).
18. See e.g., 8 OHIO JtR. 2d, Carriers § 68 (1954).
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allowed carriers to limit their liability by contract. The remainder of this
paper is devoted to an examination of the dilution of the common law
rule in these two respects, in order that a more realistic conclusion as to
the liability of a common carrier for loss or damage to freight may be
reached.
A. EXCEPTIONS TO THE COMMON LAW RuLE
It is now recognized that a common carrier is an insurer of freight
against losses except those attributable to: 1) an act of God, 2) an act
of the public enemy, 3) an act of the shipper, 4) an act of the public
authority, 5) the inherent nature of the goods themselves.'9 Only the
first two were mentioned in the early cases; 20 but later authorities have
universally agreed 2' that the passage of time has expanded the list to five
in number, each of which will be discussed below.
1. Acts of God
That loss or damage caused by an act of God absolves the carrier of
his insurer's liability is agreed upon by all the authorities. Trouble ob-
viously arises, however, when an exact definition of the term is attempted.
It may perhaps be best explained by means of a negative approach: "act
of God" is -ot synonymous with "inevitable accident." The latter in-
dudes, but is greater than, the former. A carrier remains liable for those
inevitable accidents which are the result of a chain reaction set in motion
by a human agency, such as a fire not caused by lightning, or a ship-
wreck caused by a sunken mast or false lights.2 2  An act of God, on the
other hand, is a force due entirely to physical causes: "... a flood or tor-
nado or volcano or something that is without the intervention or control
of man."23
The general rule in this area seems to be that the act of God must
be the sole cause of the loss; if it is mingled with negligence on the part
of the carrier, it will be lost as a defense to a suit by the shipper.24 The
Ohio courts, while ostensibly adhering to this rule,25 have weakened its
19. GODDARD, BAIMENn & CARRIERS § 231 (2d ed. 1928).
20. Coggs v. Bernard 2 14. Raym. 909 (1703); Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio St.
131 (1853).
21. DOBIE, BAuimNvs & CARRIERs § 116 (1914).
22. GODDARD, BAYLMENTS & CARRIERS § 233 (2d ed. 1928).
23. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Glow Electric Co., 35 Ohio App. 291, 307, 172
N.E. 425, 430 (1929).
24. 9 AM. JuR., Carriers § 713 (1937).
25. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Ry. v. Myers & Patty Co., 4 Ohio App. 493
(1915).
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effectiveness by their decisions in one area; namely, the question of the
effect of an antecedent negligent delay on the part of a carrier. When
the carrier's negligent delay in transporting the goods results in their ex-
posure to an unforeseeable act of God, the defense is still available to the
carrier, the theory being that the delay was a remote factor in the chain
of causation.26
2. Act of Public Enemy
The second exception to the rule of insurer's liability operates when
the loss is occasioned by the act of a public enemy, meaning the forces of
a country with whom the nation is at war.2 7 As noted, the ease of prac-
tice and the difficulty of proving fraud and collusion is one of the prime
reasons behind the rule making a carrier liable as an insurer. It was felt
unlikely, however, that a carrier would be in league with his country's
enemies; hence, the carrier does not suffer insurer's liability for losses
attributable to the public enemy. The exception obviously does not ap-
ply, however, when the loss is occasioned by thieves, no matter how great
their numbers28
3. Act of the Shipper
A third exception to the rule of absolute liability comprehends losses
caused by the act of the shipper. To hold another liable for one's own
wrong would be repugnant to the principles and spirit of our law; the
common carrier is, therefore, not liable for losses caused by the shipper's
negligence. If the goods have been improperly packed or loaded by the
shipper, causing their loss or damage, the carrier is relieved from its
absolute liability, provided the defect would not have been readily dis-
cernible upon ordinary inspection.29 As is the case with all the excep-
tions, this defense is available only where the act of the shipper is the
sole cause of the loss or damage; the carrier must prove that the loss was
proximately caused by the defective packing and not by any fault or
negligence on its part.3 0
26. Toledo & Ohio Central Ry. v. Kibler, 97 Ohio St. 262, 119 N.E. 733 (1918);
Daniels v. Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532 (1872).
27. GoDDARD, BAILMENTS & CARRIERS § 236 (2d ed. 1928).
28. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym 909 (1703).
29. St. Louis-San Fransisco Ry. v. Glow Electric Co., 35 Ohio App. 291, 172 N.E.
425 (1929).
30. Union Express Co. v. Graham 26 Ohio St. 596 (1875); Norfolk & Western
Ry v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 7 Ohio L. Abs. 371 (Ct. App. 1929).
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4. Act of Public Authority
Another exception to the common law role comes into play when the
loss or damage is caused by the act or mandate of public authority; pub-
lic policy demands that a carrier be protected in surrendering freight
when required to do so by the sovereign authority.
th.. de rule now seems to be established that a common carrier is not
liable, if the goods be taken from his possession by legal process against the
owner, or if, without his fault, they become obnoxious to the requirements
of the police power of the state, and are injured or destroyed by its author-
ity; as where they are infected with contagious disease, or are intoxicating
liquors intended for use or sale in violation of the laws of the state, which
require their seizure or destruction.m
In keeping with the rationale behind the whole scheme of absolute lia-
bility for common carriers, the seizure must be made without the pro-
curement or connivance of the carrier; and prompt notice to the shipper
of the seizure seems to be a condition precedent to the successful inter-
position of this exception as a defense to a suit brought by the shipper 2
5. Inherent Nature of the Property
The fifth exception relieves the common carrier of absolute liability
when the loss or damage is due to the inherent nature of the property that
has been shipped. This exception covers many situations and is probably
more important than the other four combined. It is founded upon the
same principles as the exception for losses caused by an act of God, and
may, in fact, be a mere illustration of the latter. It is usually stated, how-
ever, as a separate exception, and it generally comprehends physical
forces of a gradual nature, as opposed to those sudden catastrophes that
are thought of as acts of God. The natural decay of perishable goods
falls within this exception.83  It is the duty of the carrier, however, to
exercise reasonable care in the transportation of such goods, in order to
prevent damage from lapse of time.34 Furthermore, a jury question is
presented in the issue of whether the damage was due to the inherent
nature of the goods or to the defective condition of the carrier's facilities;
if the latter be the case, the carrier would be liable 35 The exception is
also generally held to apply to the shipment of livestock. 8
31. Raliroad Co. v. O'Donnell, 49 Ohio St. 489, 500, 32 N.E. 476, 479 (1892).
32. Railroad Co. v. O'Donnell, 49 Ohio St. 489, 32 N.E. 476 (1892).
33. American Express Co. v. Smith, 33 Ohio St. 511 (1878).
34. Hines v. Dinovo, 14 Ohio App. 119, 32 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.) 1 (1920).
35. Fean v. Alabama Great Southern R.R., 26 Ohio App. 96, 159 N.E. 487(1927).
36. The shipment of livestock has also been given special treatment by the legis-
lature. OHIo REv. CODB § 959.13 provides that a carrier must supply food and
1959]
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Accordingly, in the case of a shipment of livestock a common carrier
is not an insurer but is liable only in the case of negligence; the exception
is due to the inherent nature of the shipment, or as it is sometimes said to
the peculiar nature and propensities of the animals.'
Even such a cursory glance at the five exceptions to the common law
rule making the common carrier an insurer reveals that the various situa-
tions in which the carrier might be absolved of his extraordinary liability
are legion. When one of these exceptions is applicable, the carrier sheds
his absolute liability, and is rendered subject only to the liability of the
ordinary bailee - the duty to use reasonable care still remains with
the carrier.
B. CONTRACTUAL EXEmPTIONS
The exceptions to the rule of absolute liability do, it is true, cover a
multitude of situations. Of even greater consequence from a commercial
standpoint, however, is the doctrine permitting a common carrier to limit
the extent of his liability by contract, since it could potentially apply to
every carrier-shipper transaction.
It will be noted that the common law imposed a short of "two-level"
liability upon the common carrier of goods: 1) the responsibility of
the ordinary bailee for hire - liability for negligence; 2) The extra-
ordinary liability of an insurer - absolute liability. This distinction has
been brought into play when the courts have been called upon to deter-
mine the extent to which a carrier may limit his liability by contract. The
cases make it dear that a carrier may contract for exemption from
liability as an insurer, but any attempt to secure immunity from liability
for negligence is invalid3 8
As is the case throughout the law of common carrier, this phase of
the law has been determined by means of a trek along the arduous and
occasionally ill-defined trail of public policy. The policy favoring com-
plete freedom to contract must surely give way to the policy which
gives the greatest protection to the public safety; to allow contractual
exemption from liability for negligence would have the effect of en-
couraging negligence, thereby endangering property of others.
Now one of the strongest motives for the faithful performence of these
duties is found in the pecuniary responsibility which the carrier incurs for
other necessary attention when the livestock is detained for more than 28 hours.
OHIO REv. CODE § 957.21 requires a carrier to take all necessary steps to prevent
the spread of disease once it has been discovered.
37. Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 135 Ohio St. 560, 562, 21 N.E.2d 865, 866
(1939).
38. Welsh v. Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago R.R., 10 Ohio St. 65 (1859);
Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 362 (1854); Davidson v. Graham 2 Ohio St. 131
(1853).
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failure. It induces him to furnish safe and suitable equipment, and to em-
ploy careful and competent agents. A contract, therefore, with one to re-
lieve him from any part of this responsibility, reaches beyond the person
with whom he contracts, and affects all who place their persons or property
in his custody. It is immoral, because it diminishes the motives for the
performance of a high moral duty; and it is against public policy, because
it takes from the public a part of the security they would otherwise have."
This same public policy does not, however, apply to a contractual
exemption from insurer's liability; negligence is not encouraged by such
a contract.40 Such a contract will be valid, then, in spite of the policy
considerations which made the common carrier an insurer of goods in the
first place.
Thus, an agreement that goods are to be transported at the shipper's
risk has only the effect of relieving the carrier of the "liabilities imposed
by the common law on public carriers where there was no fault or neglect
on the part of the carrier. ' 41 A provision that the shipper assumes the
risk arising from any defect in the body of a railroad car will not exempt
the carrier from responsibility for a loss caused by the defective condition
of a car.42  Conversely, the carrier will not be liable for the value of
goods shipped under an agreement limiting the carrier's liability for loss
by fire to fires resulting from the negligence of the carrier, where the
jury has determined that the fire was not caused by the negligence of
the carrier.48  If the period of time be a reasonable one, a contract re-
quiring the shipper to make a claim for damages within a certain period
after the loss will be effective; the carrier will not be held liable unless
given such timely notice."4
A detailed examination of the scope of permissible contractual exemp-
tion from liability is beyond the purview of this note; no discussion
would be complete, however, without a word as to one area that has given
the courts particular difficulty. This is the phenomenon known as agreed
valuation, whereby the shipper sets a value on freight and agrees that
the named figure shall be the maximum amount recoverable for loss or
damage to the goods, even when caused by negligence of the carrier.
The first such agreement to come before the Ohio courts involved a situa-
tion in which the goods were known by both parties to have been under-
39. Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St 362, 377 (1854).
40. Randolph v. American Airlines, Inc., 103 Ohio App. 172, 175, 144 N.E.2d
878, 881 (1956), quoting Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331, 340 (1884);
Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 362 (1854).
41. Union Express Co. v. Graham, 26 Ohio St. 596, 598 (1875).
42. Welsh v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chicago R.R., 10 Ohio St. 65 (1859).
43. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Ry. v. Berdan & Co., 22 Ohio C.C.1K 326, 12
Ohio C.C. Dec. 487 (Ct. App. 1901).
44. Pennsylvania LR. v. Shearer, 75 Ohio St. 249, 79 N.E. 431 (1906).
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valued, such agreement being entered into in consideration of reduced
rates. The shipper, nevertheless, recovered the full value, the contract
being held invalid on the grounds that the same public policy which pre-
dudes total exemptions from liability for negligence must invalidate an
attempt to partially exempt such liability.45 Later cases, have retreated
in great strides from this position. This case has been distinguished
from that in which there was no evidence that the carrier knew of the
undervaluation; the shipper's recovery in the latter situation has been
limited -to the agreed value.46 We are told that this does not run afoul
of the public policy which precludes limitation of liability for negligence,
since this is not a limitation on liability but upon the amount of lia-
bility.47 Since a carrier's knowledge of an undervaluation would be
extremely difficult of proof, the practical effect of these cases is that
liability may effectively be limited to an agreed figure, which will con-
stitute the maximum recovery for negligence, even if it be far less than
the actual value of the goods lost or damaged.
By these contractual devices, then, the common carrier can greatly
immunize himself from the sting to which the common law subjected
him. By statute in Ohio, a common carrier may insert any conditions in
a bill of lading which do not relieve him of the duty to use due care.48
The Code further provides that the terms of a bill of lading become bind-
ing when the bill is received without objection to its terms.49  It is
obvious that the experienced corporate carrier will make the fullest per-
missible utilization of contractual exemptions in its bills of lading.50
One legislative restriction upon contractual exemptions must still be
mentioned. By statute in Ohio, the initial carrier is made liable for loss
or damage caused 'by any connecting carrier, and this liability may not
be exempted by any contract.51 This enactment has not appreciably
45. U.S. Express Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. 144 (1875).
46. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Hubbard, 72 Ohio St. 302, 74 N.E. 214 (1905).
47. Ibid. But ct. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Euclid Builders Supply
Co., 11 Ohio App. 196 (1919), in which one lower court subsequently again re-
versed the field, at least in the case in which the negligence of the carrier amounted
to a conversion.
48. OHIO Rav. CODE § 4965.03.
49. OHIO Rav. CODE § 4965.04. This statute abrogates the common law, which
would presume that a shipper intended to insist upon his full rights, in the absence
of clear proof that he assented to a limitation of liability. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati &
St. Louis Ry. v. Barrett, 36 Ohio St. 448 (1881); Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 362
(1854).
50. See, for example a "uniform livestock contract." Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
135 Ohio St. 560, 21 N.E.2d 865 (1939).
51. OHIO REV. CODE § 4965.54. The Interstate Commerce Act contains a similar
provision. 34 Star. 595 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1946).
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changed the general case law in the field; it merely makes the initial
carrier liable to the extent he would have been had the loss occurred on
his line, as defined by the framework discussed above.
III. CONCLUSION
That a common carrier is the insurer of goods is still ostensibly the
law of Ohio. This is not, however, an entirely realistic statement of the
carrier's responsibility. The exceptions to the rule are applicable to
numerous situations, thus extinguishing absolute liability. A carrier may,
furthermore, escape this extraordinary responsibility by means of the
relatively simple device known as a contractual exemption. The practical
result, then, is that the common carrier will seldom, if ever, suffer the
liability of an insurer; it will be liable only to the same extent as any
other bailee for hire 2
It is submitted that this practical result is a just one and one more in
harmony with the development of our economic and social institutions.
Road agents no longer are a significant threat to commerce, nor is the
possibility of collusion with thieves on the part of our great carrying
corporations. Many other occupations constitute a public employment,
none of which suffers insurer's liability. One wonders, indeed, as to the
soundness of the rule even at its inception. Speaking of the reasons
originally given by Lord Holt53 for the rule, Mr. Justice Holmes has this
to say:
These reasons apply to other bailees as well as common carriers... If
there is a sound rule of public policy which ought to impose a special re-
sponsibility upon common carriers, as those words are now understood, and
upon no others, it has never yet been stated.!
This is not to say, however, that the common carrier should not be
made to suffer some special burden, owing to its peculiar status. One
of the reasons given for the common law rule was the fact that negligence
on the part of the carrier is difficult of proof: "Doing it in such a
clandestine manner as would not be possible to be discovered." 55 ".... [G] o-
52. Interstate carriers are, as a practical matter, generally liable only for their own
negligence. This is true because of certain uniform tariff rules which have been
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Arpaia and Jensen, Common Car-
tier Liability in the Atomic Age, 51 MiCH. L. REv. 1173, n.4 (1953).
In Ohio, however, a common carrier may not relieve himself of any liability by
means of a rule contained in the schedule on file with the Public Utilities Commis-
sion. Erie R.R. v. Steinberg, 94 Ohio St. 189, 113 NYE. 814 (1916).
53. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (1703).
54. HoLMS, THE CommoN LAw 2o4 (1881).
55. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 918 (1703).
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